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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM

use it had passed. It has been said that the development of the law is more continuous than it is sporadic, and the fact that its course is capable of prediction is
some consolation. Each decided case that has gone through the courts cannot
be reexamined and redecided with each enlargement of the law, and the
refusal of the Court to expand the scope of coram nobis to these situations appears sound. There seemingly cannot be an effective corrective remedy for the
individual who suffers the injustice that may result from a range of practicing
law characterized as something less than brilliant, down through and including
poor, as distinguished from shockingly inadequate, legal representation. Rather,
the remedy must continue to be a preventive one, sustained by high standards
of integrity and excellence within the legal profession.
Carl B. Kustell
RIGHT

To

PROMPT TRIAL NOT LOST BY INCARCERATED PRISONER WHERE RE-

QUEST FOR NEW TRIAL NOT FORWARDED TO PROSECUTOR BY PRISON AUTHORITIES

Defendants were charged, by a Bronx County indictment filed September
20, 1957, with the crimes of kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, and assault
in the second degree. They were convicted of robbery in the first degree and
assault in the second degree on December 4, 1958 and sentenced to prison terms.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed these convictions and directed a
new trial on March 1, 1960. Defendants were incarcerated when they were
notified on March 2, 1960 of the reversal of the conviction. On that day, they
both made request through the chief clerk of the prison, pursuant to law, that the
Bronx County indictment (underlying the conviction that had been reversed)
be disposed of within 180 days.1 This request was not forwarded to the district
attorney of Bronx County. On January 16, 1961, ten months after the request
for disposal had been made, the defendants were produced in the Bronx County
Court for trial on the basis of the indictment. Defendants moved that the indictment be dismissed on the ground that they had not been brought to trial
within the 180 day period. This motion was denied on the ground that the
district attorney had not received any request from the defendants that the
indictment be disposed of and that therefore, the 180 day period had not commenced to run. Defendants pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the third
degree. On appeal from the judgments entered on the pleas with specific request
that the order denying the motion for dismissal of the indictment be reviewed,
the Appellate Division reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictment
with prejudice 2 The People appeal by permission of an associate judge of the
Court of Appeals; held, affirmed unanimously, the failure or refusal by the commissioner of correction or his agent to send on to the district attorney requests
of two prisoners that another case against them be brought on for trial within
1. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 669-a.
2. People v. Masselli, 17 A.D.2d 367, 234 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1st Dep't 1962).
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180 days did not defeat the prisoners' right to prompt trial or the dismissal of
the indictment. People v. Masselli, 13 N.Y.2d 1, 191 N.E.2d 457, 240 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1963).
The guarantee of a speedy trial serves a number of salutary purposes. It
protects the accused, if incarcerated, against prolonged imprisonment while
awaiting trial; it frees the accused from the mental anguish and the suspicion
of the public which are attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and, it
acts like a statute of limitation by preventing the accused being brought to trial
after such a lapse of time that witnesses might be unreliable and proof of his
guilt or innocence might be suspect, and by removing the possibility of his
harassment by the threat of being prosecuted for crimes committed in the distant
past. A public function is also served by the incentive placed upon public
prosecutors to promptly dispose of criminal charges since a failure to do so could
result in the charges being dismissed and prosecution being precluded. It is
generally the policy of the law that criminal cases be disposed of promptly.8
The right of an accused to have his case brought on for trial promptly is guaranteed by the federal constitution 4 (though this provision does not apply to the
states) and either by constitutional provision or by statute in most of the states.6
It has been held in some jurisdictions that unless the defendant makes known
his desire for a speedy trial promptly and affirmatively he is deemed to have
waived the right.6 A harsh example of this view is the case of a defendant who
was convicted of second degree murder almost twenty-eight years after an indictment for homicide. 7 The federal courts have generally embraced the view
that a failure on the part of the defendant to promptly and affirmatively demand
a speedy trial is a waiver of his right under the constitution.8 The second view
is that the state initiates the action and it is the state which must see that the
defendant is protected by being given a speedy trial. The prevailing view in
New York is the latter. 9
In New York, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by statute. 10 The
Court of Appeals has held that even in the absence of any affirmative action on
the part of the defendant an indictment must be dismissed unless promptly
brought to trial." In 1957, an additional safeguard was provided the accused
by the enactment of a statute providing that a prisoner may demand a speedy
trial and such a trial must be had within 180 days after his demand or the indictment will be dismissed with prejudice. 12 The procedure set up is essentially
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(2) (1961).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
5. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(2) (1961).
6. See, e.g., Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 1940); McCandless
3.

v. District Court, 245 Iowa 599, 61 N.W.2d 674 (1953); State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153,
216 N.W. 787 (1927); State ex rel. Davis v. Bayless, 38 Okla. Crim. 129, 259 Pac. 606 (1927).
7. State v. O'Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 135 A.2d 321 (1957).
8. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
9. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
10. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 8, 668; N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 12.
11. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
12. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 669-a.
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that the prisoner may request that he be brought to trial within 180 days, after
causing the district attorney of the county in which the indictment is pending to
have notice of his request, for a final disposition of such indictment; and, that the
notice above mentioned shall be given or sent to the commissioner of correction
who shall promptly forward it to the appropriate district attorney. 13 The issue
raised in the instant case is whether, after the prisoners have complied with the
statute, a failure or refusal of the commissioner of correction or his agent to
forward notice to the proper district attorney can defeat the right of the prisoner
to a prompt trial or dismissal of the indictment. The Court of Appeals answered
in the negative.
In reaching the present decision, the Court considered first the actions of
the prisoners. It found that they had complied with the statutory requirement
of notice of their request. Notice had been given to the chief clerk of the prison,
the agent of the commissioner of correction. The court then considered the actions of the prison officials. The prison officials had refused to forward the
requests to the district attorney and had also refused to provide other information required by law. The duty imposed by the statute was not discretionary
but was mandatory. Therefore the prison officials simply failed to comply with
the duty imposed upon them. The district attorney argued that the default or
neglect of the Correction Department officials should not be charged to the
prosecution. To this argument the Court replied that since both the district
attorney and the commissioner of correction were the agents of the state, it
would not be proper to charge the default or neglect of either or both of them
to the prisoners who were helpless in the matter. Since the obvious purpose of
the statute was to give prisoners the option of requiring that pending, untried
indictments be promptly disposed of, it would wholly defeat the purpose to
allow the default or neglect of agents of the state to defeat the right of the
prisoners and would render the statute ineffectual. Therefore, as between the
state and the prisoner, the burden for such a default should fall upon the state.
The interpretation which the Court puts upon the statute in question is
certainly the only logical one to reach. To have decided to the contrary would
have wholly defeated the purpose of the statute and would have rendered it
ineffectual. Though district attorneys may feel that they are at the mercy of
prison officials who may neglect to notify them of requests such as the present
one, this is not altogether true. As the Court pointed out, the district attorney
could inquire into the matter without difficulty. It may appear that criminals
should not be set free simply because of a default or neglect on the part of some
agent of the state; 14 but, the Court relied upon what seems to be a complete
answer to this objection: "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law
that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
13.
14.

N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 669-a(1) (a)-(b).
See 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 138, 141 (1962).
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failure to observe its own laws, or worse its disregard of the charter of its own
existence." 15
William J. Kirk
CoRAmi

NOBIS AS PROPER REMEDY FOR TESTIMONY NOT PERJURED AND

NOT

KNOWINGLY USED

Defendant was indicted for his participation in a holdup robbery. In
defendant's 1957 trial the only testimony naming defendant as one of the
two robbers was given by the driver of the getaway car, whose story required
corroboration. This was supplied by the District Attorney's stenographer who
put in evidence an unsigned statement of the defendant admitting his guilt.
The defense to the statement was defendant's testimony that during the period
of interrogation he had been threatened, assaulted and plied with wine and that
therefore his admission of guilt was not voluntary. In rebuttal several police
officers who had participated in the questioning testified they witnessed none
of the intimidation and coercion alleged by defendant. Only one of these officers,
City Detective James F. Casey, the detective in charge, testified he had been
there for the entire period of detention-the others admitting only brief contact
with defendant. Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery, second degree
grand larceny, and second degree assault. Subsequently, a writ of error coram
nobis was denied after a hearing despite the admission by Detective Casey that
his testimony had been false-that actually he had been absent from the
interrogation for several hours-on the finding of the County Judge that the
false testimony given at the criminal trial was not perjurous, the prosecutor
was not aware of the falsity and that the untrue testimony was not material.
On appeal by permission, held, reversed and new trial ordered. Unintentional
false testimony is "in its way as much of a 'fraud' on the court as if it were deliberate . . . . Coram nobis proceedings have as their prime purpose the redress
of such frauds." People v. Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355, 190 N.E.2d 19, 239
N.Y.S.2d 673 (1963).
The common law writ of error coram nobis was given statutory recognition
in New York in 1947.1 Until shortly before such recognition, however, a court
of original jurisdiction was generally held not to have the power to reopen a
conviction based on fraud or misrepresentation after judgment had been
rendered and the defendant had commenced to serve his time. 2 Coram nobis

was not in use in New York,3 and habeas corpus did not lie as long as the defendant was imprisoned by a court having competent jurisdiction over both
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961), as cited in People v. Masselli, 13 N.Y.2d
1, 191 N.E.2d 457, 240 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1963).

1.
revised
2.
(1953).
3.

N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 517, as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 706, § 1;
and clarified by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 806, § 1, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 698, § 8.
For a concise history of coram nobis in New York, see Frank, Coram Nobis 112.02
Ibid.

